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The Regulation of Gestation: A Call for More
Complete State Statutory Regulation of
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts
Amanda M. Herman*
In 2006, Angelia Robinson agreed to act as a gestational
surrogate and carry a pregnancy for her brother, Donald
Hollingsworth, and his same-sex spouse, Sean.1 Robinson became
pregnant and gave birth to twin girls, who were genetically
related to Sean and an anonymous egg donor.2 Five months after
giving birth, Robinson filed a lawsuit to gain physical and legal
custody of the twins.3 Despite not being genetically related to the
twins, a superior court judge ruled that Robinson was the legal
mother of the children.4 After a five-year-long court battle, full
custody was awarded to the biological father, Sean, but Robinson
maintained parental visitation rights.5
Gestational
surrogacy
arrangements
have
become
increasingly common in recent years as they provide a way for
infertile couples to have children.6 However, as the example
above illustrates, these agreements have the potential to end
negatively, often in prolonged litigation. States have approached
the issue of gestational surrogacy in varying ways, with no
uniformity amongst the many approaches.7 Without clear and
comprehensive
guidelines
for
gestational
surrogacy
arrangements, individuals will be left without guidance in
creating these contracts, which will ultimately lead to the courts

* JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015; BA, California
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, March 2012. I would like to thank
Professor Marisa Cianciarulo for her guidance throughout the writing process, the
Chapman Law Review staff for their comments and suggestions, and my family for their
unwavering support.
1 Stephanie Saul, New Jersey Judge Calls Surrogate Legal Mother of Twins, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31surrogate.html?_r=1&.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Ted Sherman, N.J. Gay Couple Fight for Custody of Twin 5-Year-Old Girls,
NJ.COM (Dec. 20, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/12/nj_gay_coup
le_fight_for_custod.html.
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part I.
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having to decide who is legally responsible for the children born
of these agreements.
Without federal guidance, states have been left to formulate
their own approaches for permitting, enforcing, and regulating
gestational surrogacy agreements. This has led to a complete
lack of uniformity among the states, with some expressly
prohibiting these agreements8 and others failing to address this
issue at all.9 The District of Columbia has even gone so far as to
criminalize surrogacy arrangements, subjecting offenders to civil
fines, imprisonment, or both.10 Therefore, the outcome of each
gestational surrogacy agreement is entirely dependent on which
state law controls the situation and how that particular state has
chosen to handle gestational surrogacy contracts.
California and Connecticut are two states that have chosen
to permit gestational surrogacy arrangements by statutorily
regulating the gestational surrogacy process. However, despite
the fact that California and Connecticut have taken similar
approaches to regulating gestational surrogacy, the statutory
schemes utilized by these states differ greatly from one another.
As will be discussed below, California’s statutes provide more
specific and thorough regulations of the gestational carrier
process, while Connecticut’s statutes provide the bare minimum
in terms of detail.
This Comment will argue that states should implement
comprehensive statutory regulations for gestational surrogacy
agreements that provide specific and complete guidelines for
parties wishing to create these contracts. Part I will provide
relevant background information and a brief history of assisted
reproductive technology in the United States. Part II will outline
and analyze the relevant California and Connecticut gestational
surrogacy statutes, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of
the current regulations in place in those states. Part III will
propose that states wishing to enact legislation to regulate and
enforce gestational agreements should emulate the approach
utilized by the California legislature, as opposed to that of the
Connecticut legislature, since California’s statutory scheme is
more complete, stringent, and efficient. Finally, Part IV will
8 John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 924 (1996); see also infra Part I.C.
9 See Diane S. Hinson, State-by-State Surrogacy Law: Actual Practices, CREATIVE
FAM. CONNECTIONS (2013), http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/state-map-surro
gacy-law-practices.
10 D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2014) (“Any person . . . who . . . violates this section, shall be
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year,
or both.”).
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briefly discuss the need for state legislatures to strike a delicate
balance when creating surrogacy-based statutory regulations.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology
For people who are unable to conceive or carry a child
naturally, there are many alternative approaches that can be
utilized to help start a family. Many couples choose adoption,
which is both a costly and time-consuming process.11 In recent
years, however, an increasing number of people have turned to
assisted reproductive technology, commonly referred to as “ART,”
as a means to have children. ART has been defined in varying
ways, but the broadest definition includes “any technology that is
employed to conceive a child by means other than sexual
intercourse.”12 Such technology includes egg donation, embryo
donation, in vitro fertilization, and the transfer of fertilized
embryos.13
The first uses of ART began in the mid-1970s, and the
world’s first “test-tube baby” was born as a result of these early
ART procedures in 1978.14 The number of ART cycles performed
in the United States per year has drastically increased, and in
2011 a total of 151,923 ART cycles took place.15
The possibilities ART provides to individuals who need
assistance starting a family are great. Unlike adoption, couples
11 Adoptions performed independently or through private adoption agencies can cost
upwards of $40,000. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF ADOPTING 2 (2011), available at https://www.child
welfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costs.pdf. Inter-country adoptions often take well over a year to
complete, and some countries even require adoptive parents to live in the foreign country
for six months before completing the adoption. James G. Dwyer, Inter-country Adoption
and the Special Rights Fallacy, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 189, 191 (2013).
12 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, A SSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE, at xii (2006)); see also
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (defining “assisted reproductive technology” a s
“all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled”).
13 Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002).
14 Louise Brown was the first child born as a result of in vitro fertilization (IVF).
Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS .
L. REV. 609, 619 (1997).
15 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 2011, at 47
(2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2011/PDFs/ART_2011_National_Summ
ary_Report.pdf. This number more than doubled from a total of 64,681 ART cycles that
took place in 1996. CTRS. FOR D ISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. D EP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL
SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 61 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/
ART 2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf.
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utilizing ART have the ability to be genetically related to the
resulting child.16 Women who are unable to carry a child to term,
but are otherwise reproductively healthy, can still be genetically
related to their child through these technologies.17 Reproductive
technology has even come so far as to allow a child to be
genetically related to two mothers, as well as a father.18
B. Surrogacy: A Form of ART
One form of ART is surrogacy, which includes two specific
subcategories: traditional surrogates and gestational carriers. A
traditional surrogate is a woman who becomes pregnant by way
of a sperm donor and carries the pregnancy to term.19 In a
traditional surrogacy arrangement, the woman carrying the child
is the biological mother and agrees to relinquish all parental
rights to her child upon giving birth.20 Statistics on the rates of
traditional surrogacy in the United States are rare, and some
studies have gone so far as to say there is “no data whatsoever on
the use of traditional surrogacy.”21 Lack of statistical data aside,
traditional surrogacy has been present in society for hundreds, if
not thousands, of years.22
A gestational carrier, however, is a woman who is not related
to the child she carries and ultimately bears. In a gestational
carrier arrangement, the woman “is implanted with the sperm of
the biological father and the eggs of the biological
mother[,] . . . eliminating any biological relationship between the
surrogate mother and child.”23 Gestational carrier arrangements

16 Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL ’Y 21, 22 (1989) (arguing for contractual
enforcement of traditional surrogacy contracts, which allow for “genetic continuity”
between at least one intended parent and the child).
17 Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare” Reconsidered: A Proposed
Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625,
640–41 (1991).
18 In a technique known as “egg cell nuclear transfer,” the nucleus of one woman’s
egg cell can be joined with an enucleated egg cell from another woman, which creates an
egg cell comprised of two different sets of DNA. Bonnie Steinbock, Defining Parenthood,
in FREEDOM AND R ESPONSIBILITY IN REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107, 107 (JR Spencer & Antje
du Bois-Pedain eds., 2006).
19 SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING
LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 209 (2010).
20 MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN
AMERICA 1, 6 (2010), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/page
documents/kaevej0a1m.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Christine L. Kerian, Note, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile
Women or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
113, 116–17 (1997) (positing that surrogacy dates back to the Old Testament).
23 Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 97, 98–99 (2010).

Do Not Delete

2015]

2/15/2015 7:40 PM

The Regulation of Gestation

557

in the United States have grown rapidly in recent years, nearly
doubling in frequency from 2004 to 2008.24
C. Surrogacy Statutes Throughout the United States
With the increased frequency of ART and surrogacy
arrangements in the United States, legislation to regulate these
procedures became a necessary and logical step for states. Yet,
how states have chosen to go about regulating surrogacy and
gestational carrier agreements is entirely inconsistent. Some
states have decided to ban surrogacy and prohibit the
enforcement of traditional or gestational surrogacy agreements
entirely.25 A few states have held that surrogacy contracts are
only legal if the woman carrying the child is not compensated. 26
Other states have explicitly enacted legislation holding these
arrangements to be valid,27 while some states merely rely on case
law to uphold surrogacy agreements.28 Yet, some states have
simply left the issue alone for now, and remain without case law
or statutes addressing the validity of surrogacy.29 Given this lack
of consensus amongst states regarding surrogacy, a great
responsibility is placed upon all parties entering into such

24 The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) found the number of
children born via gestational surrogacy per year to rise from 738 in 2004 to 1395 in 2008.
GUGUCHEVA, supra note 20, at 11–12. In the last several years, many celebrities have
even turned to gestational carriers as a way to have children. Celebrities Who Used
Surrogate Mothers, FOX NEWS MAG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://magazine.foxnews.com/athome/celeb rities-who-used-surrogate-mothers.
25 Robertson, supra note 8, at 924. Indiana’s statute declares enforcement of a
surrogacy contract to be against public policy. IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2014). Michigan’s
statutes also prohibit surrogacy contracts on the basis of public policy. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 722.855 (2014).
26 Spivack, supra note 23, at 101 (including Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New
York, North Carolina, and Washington). Furthermore, Louisiana’s surrogacy laws are
presently in a state of flux, with the governor vetoing a recently proposed bill. Louisiana
House Bill 187, LEGISCAN, http://legiscan.com/LA/bill/HB187/2014 (last visited Jan. 10,
2015). This bill sought to permit gestational surrogacy only in the case of a married man
and woman using their own genetic material. H.R. 187, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).
Aside from limiting the use of egg and sperm donors in these arrangements, this bill
restricted homosexual couples from engaging in gestational carrier contracts in Louisiana
whatsoever. Id. Critics of the bill considered this proposed legislation a reminder that
true reproductive freedom is not yet a reality. See Richard Vaughn, Louisiana Surrogacy
Bill Advances from Bad to Worse, INT’L FERTILITY L. GROUP (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.iflg.net/louisiana-surrogacy-bill-advances-from-bad-to-worse/.
27 These states include California and Illinois. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2014);
750 ILL . COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2014).
28 For Ohio’s Supreme Court decision finding gestational surrogacy contracts do not
violate public policy see J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007). Maryland case law
supports the enforcement of gestational surrogacy contracts as well. See In re Roberto
d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (finding a gestational carrier was allowed to not be listed as
the child’s birth mother and, instead, the child’s father could be listed as the only parent).
29 Hinson, supra note 9 (citing Alaska, Georgia, Delaware, and several other states
as having no definitive case law or statute on the issue of gestational surrogacy).
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agreements to be well informed of the legal landscape of their
particular state.30
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF GESTATIONAL CARRIER
REGULATIONS: CALIFORNIA AND CONNECTICUT AS EXAMPLES
As if the inherent disparity between how states choose to
address gestational carrier agreements isn’t enough, there is a
great lack of uniformity among states that have enacted
legislation protecting surrogacy and regulating the process.
While these states have all determined that surrogacy and
gestational carrier agreements are permissible, a shockingly
small number have enacted comprehensive regulatory schemes to
control the surrogacy process. Without thorough and detailed
guidelines for gestational carrier agreements, the courts, legal
professionals, and citizens looking to enter into these agreements
are left in need of answers.
California and Connecticut are states that have both
determined gestational carrier contracts to be permissible31 and
have enacted legislation specifically addressing such contracts.
However, the differences between California’s and Connecticut’s
regulation of gestational carrier agreements are vast. This
section will discuss those differences in depth and identify the
ways Connecticut’s statutory scheme is lacking in substance.
A. California Case Law
1. Establishing the Intent Doctrine for Determining
Parentage
The current framework of California’s gestational surrogacy
statutes had its beginning in case law. The most influential case,
Johnson v. Calvert, established the intent doctrine for
determining legal parentage.32 In Johnson, Mark and Crispina
Calvert were a married couple who could not have a child
traditionally.33 They contracted with Anna Johnson to gestate an
embryo comprised of Mark’s sperm and Crispina’s egg.34
However, the relationship between the Calverts and Johnson
deteriorated and the Calverts initiated suit to declare that they
were the legal parents of the child. Johnson responded with an
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 19, at 212–13.
While both California and Connecticut allow parties to enter into gestational
carrier agreements, Connecticut’s statutes do not contain a presumption of validity
provision for these contracts. See infra Part II.C.5.
32 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
33 Id. at 778.
34 Id.
30
31
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action to assert her status as the child’s legal mother.35 In
holding that Johnson had no legal rights to the child, the court
reasoned that the Calverts were the legal parents of the child
based on their intention in entering into the gestational carrier
contract.36 The court articulated the intent doctrine, which it
identified as the proper way to determine the child’s parentage,
as “when [genetic consanguinity and giving birth] . . . do not
coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—
that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that
she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under
California law.”37
2. Expanding the Intent Doctrine
After Johnson v. Calvert, case law in California quickly
expanded the application of the intent doctrine to extend beyond
married heterosexual couples who were genetically related to the
child. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, the California Court of
Appeal extended the intent doctrine to include parents who were
not genetically related to a child born via a gestational surrogacy
arrangement.38 Luanne and John Buzzanca entered into a
contract with a gestational carrier, under which the woman
would carry and give birth to a child genetically unrelated to
either John or Luanne.39 After divorcing, Luanne claimed that
she and John were the lawful parents, while John claimed he had
no legal obligation to the child.40 Astonishingly, the trial court
found that the child had no legal parents.41 The Court of Appeal
disagreed with the trial court’s decision and found that John and
Luanne were the child’s legal parents “given their initiating role
as the intended parents in [the child’s] conception and birth.”42
The court in Buzzanca expressed concern that the state of
gestational surrogacy laws was woefully underdeveloped and
specifically made a call for the legislature to address the problem.
The court noted that artificial reproduction, including artificial
insemination, traditional surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, and
Id.
Id. at 782.
Id.
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. The trial court reasoned that the gestational carrier and her husband were not
the lawful parents because neither was genetically related to the child. The trial court
then found that Luanne was not the mother because she had neither provided the egg nor
given birth to the child. Finally, the court found that John was not the legal father
because he had not contributed his sperm to the embryo implanted in the gestational
carrier. Id. The Court of Appeal also noted that the woman and man who donated the egg
and sperm to create the embryo made no legal claim to the child. Id. at 288.
42 Id. at 293.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
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even cloning, is something that the courts will have to address.
The court asked the legislature to enact a law that, even if not
perfectly implemented on a case-by-case basis, “would bring some
predictability to those who seek to make use of artificial
reproductive techniques.”43
In 2000, the California Court of Appeal further expanded the
reach of the intent doctrine for determining parentage to include
parents who were not married when they contracted to bring
about the birth of the child. In Dunkin v. Boskey, an unmarried
couple entered into an agreement to use artificial insemination
by an anonymous sperm donor to conceive their child.44 After the
child was born, the parents ended their relationship and sought
to establish a custody agreement.45 The court held that the intent
doctrine also applies to unmarried couples and the man who
contracted to create the child was the legal father.46 The court
noted that the decision to apply the intent test in this way
“serves . . . the compelling public policies of family law to
legitim[ize] children, provide for their support, foster the best
interests of the child, and promote familial responsibility.”47
In 2005, the Supreme Court of California expanded the
intent doctrine again to apply to situations where same-sex
couples had intended to create a child through ART. In Elisa B.
v. Superior Court, an unmarried lesbian couple utilized artificial
insemination to conceive children with the aid of a sperm donor.48
After ending their relationship, the women sought to establish
the legal parentage of their three children.49 The court held that
both women were the legal parents of all three children under
the intent doctrine.50 In Elisa B., the court referenced the
legislature’s declaration that “‘[t]here is a compelling state
interest in establishing paternity for all children,’” as doing so
provides children with “both emotional and financial support.”51

Id.
Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). There are two
kinds of artificial insemination: homologous and heterologous. Homologous insemination
involves the use of the husband’s sperm to create the child and, as a result, does not raise
any questions about the child’s paternity. Heterologous insemination utilizes the semen of
a third-party donor to conceive a child. People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 498 n.2 (Cal.
1968).
45 Dunkin, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48.
46 Id. at 56.
47 Id.
48 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 663 (Cal. 2005).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 670.
51 Id. at 669.
43
44
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B. Connecticut Case Law
1. Early Case Law
Connecticut case law, as compared to California’s, has been
slower to adopt the intent doctrine for determining legal
parentage in gestational carrier agreements. In 2007, a
Connecticut superior court found that a husband and wife were
the legal parents of a child conceived under a gestational carrier
agreement.52 In that case, and many others with similar factual
situations, the court examined the gestational carrier agreement
and determined that the agreement was reasonable, fair, and
valid.53 However, the courts in Connecticut were not consistent
with their decisions concerning gestational carrier agreements.
In 2008, a Connecticut superior court explicitly refused to apply
the intent doctrine and held that the biological father’s same-sex
partner needed to legally adopt the child in order to be included
on the birth certificate as a parent.54 Instead of utilizing the
intent doctrine, the court focused on the best interests of the
child and reasoned that a formal adoption process was better
suited to serve the child’s overall interests.55 In support for the
best interest test, the court cited legal scholars who advocated
that a child’s interests were better served by adoption than by
the more removed and less thorough intent doctrine.56 The court
raised concerns about the state of Connecticut’s gestational
surrogacy laws and called upon the legislature to establish a
regulatory scheme to govern such transactions.57

52 De Bernardo v. Gregory, No. FA074007658S, 2007 WL 4357736, at *4 (Conn. Nov.
7, 2007).
53 See Griffiths v. Taylor, No. FA084015629, 2008 WL 2745130, at *7 (Conn. June
13, 2008) (finding that two homosexual domestic partners were the legal parents of a child
born via a valid gestational surrogacy agreement); Davis v. Kania, 836 A.2d 480, 483
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding a gestational carrier agreement valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable under the laws of Connecticut).
54 Oleski v. Hynes, No. KNLFA084008415, 2008 WL 2930518, at *12 (Conn. July 10,
2008).
55 Id. at *10.
56 Id. (quoting Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the
Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127 (2000)).
57 Id. at *11. The court posed the following concern about continuing to leave
regulation of gestational carrier agreements in the hands of the judiciary:
The combination of high vulnerability on the part of their consumers, the
presumably lucrative environment in which these services are being provided,
the lack of public awareness as to what they do and how they do it, and the
fundamental, lifelong consequences to the children whose lives their efforts
literally bring into being all warrant discussion of whether our becoming one of
the few, if not the only venue in this land in which such a business can be
carried on without effective supervision, is a desirable goal.
Id.
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2. Establishing the Intent Doctrine for Determining
Parentage
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Connecticut followed
California’s lead and adopted the intent doctrine for deciding a
child’s legal parentage under gestational surrogacy agreements.58
In Raftopol v. Ramey, two male domestic partners contracted
with a woman to carry children who were to be genetically
related to one of the two men.59 The court found both men were
properly named as the legal parents of the children and reasoned
“that the legislature intended . . . to confer parental status on an
intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement
irrespective of that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the
children.”60 The court noted its decision to adopt the intent test
was influenced directly by Johnson v. Calvert.61 Finally, the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Raftopol expressed concerns about
the “many remaining ambiguities” in Connecticut’s gestational
carrier statutes and impliedly called upon the legislature to
remedy these ambiguities.62
C. Current Statutes in California and Connecticut
In response in part to the judicial pleas in Buzzanca and
Raftopol, both California and Connecticut enacted and currently
follow statutory schemes that attempt to regulate the surrogacy
process. At first glance, it appears that California and
Connecticut have both adopted sufficient legislation and,
therefore, taken the steps necessary to appropriately regulate
traditional and gestational surrogacy. However, further analysis
reveals that California’s statutory scheme is much more
comprehensive and effective than Connecticut’s legislation,
which leaves much to be desired.
1. Definitions Provided
a. Definitions in California and Connecticut Statutes
Under current California law, the legislature has provided
definitions for many terms relating to ART and, specifically,
gestational carrier agreements. These definitions have fully
incorporated the intent doctrine, first established in Johnson
See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 797. The court identified some of the ambiguities present in Connecticut
law, which included the nature and scope of the phrase “order of a court of competent
jurisdiction,” the types of gestational agreements that were covered under the law, and
who could be recognized as an intended parent. Id.
58
59
60
61
62
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v. Calvert,63 into California law. The term “assisted reproduction
agreement” is defined as “a written contract that includes a
person who intends to be the legal parent of a child or children
born through assisted reproduction and that defines the terms of
the relationship between the parties to the contract.”64 California
law also defines the term “intended parent” to mean an
“individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent to
be legally bound as the parent of a child resulting from assisted
reproduction.”65 The statute also provides a definition of the term
“assisted reproduction.”66
As previously discussed, there are two types of surrogacy and
each gives rise to unique concerns regarding implementation and
public policy. The California legislature took care to define these
terms separately and make clear that each type of surrogacy
presents a very different factual situation.67 Other terms that are
statutorily defined include “non-attorney surrogacy facilitator,”
“surrogacy facilitator,” and “fund management agreement.”68
Turning to Connecticut’s relevant surrogacy statutes,
Connecticut law defines “gestational agreement” as “a written
agreement for assisted reproduction in which a woman agrees to
carry a child to birth for an intended parent or intended parents,
which woman contributed no genetic material to the child.”69 The
statute also defines “intended parent” to mean “a party to a
gestational agreement who agrees, under the gestational
agreement, to be the parent of a child born to a woman by means
of assisted reproduction, regardless of whether the party has a
genetic relationship to the child.”70 This definition makes no
mention of whether the party to the gestational agreement may
be married or unmarried, as the California definition provides.71
Importantly, Connecticut law does not provide a definition for
See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7606(b) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
Id. § 7960(c).
“Assisted reproduction” is defined by the California Family Code as “conception by
any means other than sexual intercourse.” Id. § 7606(a).
67 The term “surrogate” is defined as “a woman who bears and carries a child for
another through medically assisted reproduction and pursuant to a written agreement.”
Id. § 7960(f). “Surrogate” is then further defined to include traditional and gestational
surrogates. “Traditional surrogate” is defined as “a woman who agrees to gestate an
embryo, in which the woman is the gamete donor and the embryo was created using the
sperm of the intended father or a donor arranged by the intended parent or parents.”
Id. § 7960(f)(1). “Gestational carrier,” or “surrogate,” is defined as “a woman who is not an
intended parent and who agrees to gestate an embryo that is genetically unrelated to her
pursuant to an assisted reproduction agreement.” Id. § 7960(f)(2).
68 See id. § 7960(b), (d), (e).
69 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-36(16) (2014).
70 Id. § 7-36(17).
71 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7960(c).
63
64
65
66
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surrogacy, nor does it distinguish between traditional surrogacy
and gestational carrier agreements.
b. Analysis of Definitions Provided
California law provides more complete definitions regarding
statutory terms and language. Connecticut law makes no
mention of the marital status of intended parents, while
California specifically provides that intended parents can be
either married or unmarried. This may present significant
problems for the Connecticut judiciary in interpreting the
current statute and determining whether it even applies to
unmarried intended parents.72 Absent statutory language
indicating otherwise, the question of whether the intent doctrine
applies to unmarried couples will necessarily be left up to the
courts.
Furthermore, Connecticut law does not explicitly make clear
the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogates.
Although Connecticut law does indicate that gestational
agreements apply only to women who have contributed no
genetic material to the child,73 greater clarity could be achieved
by explaining the difference between traditional and gestational
surrogacy arrangements. In enacting the current statutory
scheme in California, the legislature made clear that separating
out the definitions of traditional and gestational surrogates
would help to specifically limit the other provisions of the statute
to gestational carrier agreements, rather than traditional
surrogates.74 This increased level of clarity helps provide
contracting parties with a better understanding of what type of
agreements are permitted under the law.
2. Requirements for the Contents of Gestational Agreements
Gestational carrier and surrogacy agreements are a type of
contract governed by contract law.75 There are issues that arise
when considering the implications of utilizing contract law to
govern these agreements; however, efficient statutory schemes,
like California’s, specifically address certain terms and
72 California case law first answered this question in Dunkin v. Boskey, holding that
the intent doctrine for determining parentage applies to unmarried couples, as well as
married couples. See Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
Connecticut case law, however, has never specifically addressed the issue of whether the
intent doctrine applies to unmarried couples.
73 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-36(17).
74 Assemb. 1217, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
75 See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995) (arguing that surrogacy contracts can be fully regulated under the
canons of contract law).
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conditions that must be included in these contracts.76 This
specificity provides contracting parties with more certainty and
predictability before the child is even conceived.77 The more
detailed contractual requirements mandated by California’s
statutes provide more guidance for intended parents, gestational
carriers, legal professionals, and the courts.
a. Requirements Under California and Connecticut Law
California law includes many requirements for gestational
carrier agreements to be presumed valid. Written gestational
carrier agreements must include the following: (1) the date on
which the agreement was executed; (2) information identifying
the persons from which the gametes originated, unless donated
anonymously; and (3) the identity of the intended parent or
parents.78 Before parties complete the written gestational carrier
agreement, each party must secure independent legal counsel to
represent them in the execution of the agreement.79 This means
both the intended parents and gestational carrier must find and
retain licensed attorneys of their choosing before any written
agreement can be created. The agreement must also be signed by
all parties and notarized.80
Connecticut law requires three main components for
gestational surrogacy agreements. The agreement must: (1)
name each party to the agreement and indicate each party’s
respective obligations under the agreement; (2) be signed by each
party to the agreement and the spouse of each party, if any; and
(3) be witnessed by at least two disinterested adults and
acknowledged in the manner prescribed by law.81 Under
Connecticut law, the parties are not required to identify the
sperm and egg donors, or even indicate where the gametes were
obtained. Furthermore, Connecticut law does not require that the
parties be represented by separate legal counsel. In fact, under
Connecticut law, the parties to a gestational carrier agreement
need not be represented by legal counsel at all.

Id. at 2335.
Lori B. Andrews, Commentary, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework
for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2368 (1995) (arguing that enforcing
surrogacy contracts will not allow surrogates to change their mind and initiate long,
taxing court battles to determine the legal parents of the child; instead, all parties
involved will know who is to be the legal parents from the time the contract is entered
into, creating certainty).
78 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(1)–(3) (West 2014).
79 Id. § 7962(b).
80 Id. § 7962(c).
81 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-36(16) (2014).
76
77
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b. Analysis of Statutory Requirements
California’s legislation provides clearer guidelines as to what
gestational carrier contracts must contain. California law
requires the parties to identify where the gametes came from,
unless donated anonymously,82 and to be represented by
independent legal counsel before entering into the agreement83—
provisions the Connecticut statutes make no mention of.
Requiring that parties to the agreement obtain separate legal
counsel ensures that the interests of all parties will be advocated
for and protected by a licensed attorney. Absent a similar
provision, Connecticut’s statutes would allow for one attorney to
represent both parties in the agreement or, worse, for neither
party to be represented by an attorney in drafting the contract.
Although attorneys are bound by the applicable rules of
professional conduct,84 having one attorney represent both
parties does not ensure that each side will receive proper and
effective representation. Legislative history reveals that the
California legislature was specifically concerned with the
possibility of ineffectual representation, and it was this fear that
led to the inclusion of the independent counsel provision.85
Independent counsel for both parties was considered necessary
“because of the complexities of surrogacy agreements,” and
independent counsel was seen as a way to ensure both the
contract’s validity and that all parties were clear on their rights
and responsibilities under the agreement.86
3. Regulation of the Gestational Carrier Process
The actual process of conceiving a child through ART and
utilizing a surrogate or gestational carrier’s services is incredibly
complex. Obtaining the donor gametes and implanting the
embryos involves many medical procedures and various types of
medications.87 Intended parents often utilize the services of
companies that specialize in facilitating and creating gestational
carrier agreements, which introduces a third party into the
situation.88 Finally, gestational carrier contracts often concern a

CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(2).
Id. § 7962(b).
The Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from
representing a client where the client’s interests are adverse to that of an existing client .
CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2014).
85 Assemb. 1217, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
86 Id.
87 See ART: Step-by-Step Guide, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., www.sart.org/
detail.aspx?id=1903 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
88 Patient Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.
cdc.gov/art/PatientResources.htm (last updated July 2, 2013) (explaining that “[i]n the
82
83
84
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great deal of money used for medical procedures, medications,
and monetary compensation for the woman carrying the
pregnancy.89 Monitoring the medical and financial aspects of the
gestational carrier process requires that states include specific
statutory language to address these issues.
a. Regulation of Process in California and Connecticut
Aside from regulating the contents of the gestational carrier
agreement itself, the process of actually conceiving a child and
managing the finances are also controlled by the applicable
California statutes. First and foremost, before any medical steps
can be made towards conceiving a child, California law mandates
that the gestational carrier agreement be properly executed and
completed.90 Unless the agreement meets all of the requirements
listed in the previous section, parties are not permitted to even
begin medically preparing for an anticipated embryo transfer.
The gestational surrogacy process is further regulated by
statute through requirements concerning the handling of money
related to the agreement. The statute provides clear instructions
for surrogacy facilitators and attorneys regarding how to handle
client funds. All client funds must be placed in either “[a]n
independent, bonded escrow depository maintained by a licensed,
independent, bonded escrow company” or “[a] trust account
maintained by an attorney.”91 Furthermore, the statute explains
that “[c]lient funds may only be disbursed by the attorney or
escrow agent as set forth in the assisted reproduction agreement
and fund management agreement.”92 The statute also provides
guidelines for funds that do not need to meet these stringent
requirements.93
Connecticut law does not specifically contain any provisions
that regulate the process of gestational carrier agreements. The
statutes make no mention of the general timeline of the process

United States, more than 440 clinics provide services to patients seeking to overcome
infertility” through the use of ART).
89 See generally Financial Information, SOC’Y FOR A SSISTED REPROD. TECH.,
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1891 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
90 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(d) (West 2014) (“The parties to an assisted
reproduction agreement for gestational carriers shall not undergo an embryo transfer
procedure, or commence injectable medication in preparation for an embryo transfer for
assisted reproduction purposes, until the assisted reproduction agreement for gestational
carriers has been fully executed as required by subdivisions (b) and (c) of this section.”).
91 Id. § 7961(a).
92 Id. § 7961(c).
93 See id. § 7961(d) (“This section shall not apply to funds that are both of the
following: (1) Not provided for in the fund management agreement. (2) Paid directly to a
medical doctor for medical services or a psychologist for psychological services.”).
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or of how monetary funds are to be managed and maintained
throughout the process.
b. Analysis of Statutory Regulation of Process
California law requires that the parties hold off on all
medical procedures, including the injection of medication in
preparation for procedures, until a valid agreement is in place.94
Connecticut law is void of any similar requirement and does not
regulate the actual gestational carrier process in any way. This
type of provision provides procedural safeguards for both the
intended parents and the gestational carrier and demands that
each side is fully aware of their obligations under the contract
before beginning the process of actually conceiving a child. This
kind of regulation provides the contracting parties with a clear
timeline of how the entire gestational carrier process must be
executed, which provides predictability to all involved parties.
As previously stated, gestational carrier arrangements can
be incredibly expensive and often require that a great deal of
money change hands. Connecticut statutes are completely void of
any regulation for the monetary aspects of these agreements.
These kinds of regulations are absolutely essential in
safeguarding parties against fraud. A recent example of such
fraud comes from California where Tonya Collins, founder and
operator of surrogacy agency SurroGenesis, defrauded dozens of
families looking to have a child through gestational carriers.95
Collins created a fake financial firm to handle the financial
aspects of the gestational carrier business and used upwards of
$2 million of client funds for cars, jewelry, vacations, and other
personal expenses.96 State laws regulating the handling of money
in gestational carrier arrangements provide an important
financial safeguard for intended parents who invest a significant
amount of money in these arrangements.
4. Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship
Determining the legal parentage of a child born pursuant to
a gestational carrier agreement is of the utmost importance to
ensure that someone is legally responsible for the well-being of
the child. Some states require that the intended parents legally

See id. § 7962(d).
See Carlos Saucedo, Surrogacy Scam Unites Valley Families, ABC30 (May 15,
2013, 12:03 AM), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?id=9100963.
96 Id.; see also Maria Medina, SurroGenesis Scams Women Wanting Children, CBS
SACRAMENTO (Apr. 20, 2012, 11:50 PM), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2012/04/20/surro
genesis-scams-women-wanting-children/.
94
95
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adopt the child after he or she is born.97 However, California and
Connecticut have opted to utilize pre-birth judgments to
establish legal parentage, and both states have provided for this
option in their respective statutes.98 This statutory approach
provides more certainty to the intended parents and stability to
the child, which ultimately supports the child’s best interests.99
California law provides for pre-birth judgments so that the
intended parents can be listed on the child’s birth certificate as
the legal parents.100 An action to achieve this “may be filed before
the child’s birth” and “[t]he judgment or order may be issued
before or after the child’s or children’s birth.”101 Furthermore, an
action to establish the parent-child relationship may be brought
by any party to the gestational carrier agreement, so long as the
order sought is consistent with that agreement.102
Connecticut’s approach to establishing a parent-child
relationship is essentially identical to California’s statutory
language. Just as in California, pre-birth judgments are
permitted in Connecticut and, as a result, the intended parents
can be listed on the child’s birth certificate from the moment the
child is born.103 Furthermore, Connecticut law provides that the
replacement birth certificate issued, which will list the intended
parents as the child’s parents, “shall include all information
required to be included in a certificate of birth” and be exactly
the same as a birth certificate issued for a child who is not the
product of a gestational agreement.104

97 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009)
(holding that the genetic mother to the child in question could only legally establish
parentage through adoption when the child was born to the genetic mother’s wife through
means of implanting the embryo into the wife’s uterus).
98 Pre-birth judgments present several benefits to the parties in a gestational carrier
agreement, including the ability of the intended parents to make all medical decisions for
the child from the moment of its birth, the ability of the hospital to discharge the child to
the intended parents, the solidification of insurance coverage for the child under the
intended parent’s plan, and emotional stability for both the intended parents and the
child from the moment of birth. Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of
Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 634–35 (2005).
99 See Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive
Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986).
100 A recently approved California bill requires that birth certificates in California
replace the existing fields currently labeled as “Name of Mother” and “Name of Father”
with “Name of Parent.” Each parent is then able to further identify as the child’s
“mother,” “father,” or “parent” by checking the applicable box. Assemb. 1951, 2014 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
101 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e), (f)(2) (West 2014).
102 Id. § 7630(f).
103 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-48a(b) (2014).
104 Id.
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5. Presumption of Validity
Finally, if gestational carrier contracts are deemed to be
presumptively valid, courts will not have to determine whether
the contract is valid. Such a presumption will provide greater
certainty to both the intended parents and the woman acting as
the gestational carrier in these agreements.
a. Presumption of Validity in California and Connecticut
Statutes
California law contains specific provisions that provide a
presumption of validity for gestational surrogacy contracts.
Addressing the concern that surrogate mothers giving birth to
the child may attempt to assert their rights as parents,
California law states:
A notarized assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers
signed by all the parties, with the attached declarations of
independent attorneys, and lodged with the superior court . . . shall
rebut any presumptions . . . as to the gestational carrier surrogate,
her spouse, or partner being a parent of the child or children. 105

Furthermore, California law extends a presumption of validity to
all gestational carrier agreements executed in accordance with
California Family Code section 7962, meaning the agreement
cannot be revoked or rescinded without a court order.106
Unlike California law, Connecticut statutes do not contain a
presumption of validity provision for gestational carrier
agreements. Parties who enter into these agreements in
Connecticut are not provided statutory protection as to the
validity of their agreements, regardless of whether the
agreement complies with the other provisions of Connecticut law.
b. Analysis of Statutory Approaches to Presumption of
Validity
Connecticut’s lack of presumed validity for gestational
carrier agreements provides less protection to parties engaged in
these contracts. When the law presumes the validity of these
agreements, all parties involved have much more certainty when
entering into the contract. If a state presumes these agreements
to be valid, surrogate mothers will be less likely to believe they
have a right to custody of the child, and intended parents will

105
106

CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(1).
Id. § 7962(i).
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have more certainty that when their baby is born, they, and they
alone, will have a legal claim to custody.107
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: STATES ENACTING GESTATIONAL
CARRIER STATUTES SHOULD EMULATE CALIFORNIA’S STATUTORY
SCHEME TO BETTER REGULATE THESE ARRANGEMENTS
In creating the statutes currently in place, the California
legislature expressed its desire to provide intended parents,
surrogates, and courts with “a clear procedure to follow in
creating and enforcing surrogacy agreements and determining
parental rights.”108 While Connecticut law does provide some
guidance to parties wishing to enter into these agreements,
Connecticut’s statutory scheme is just one example of how some
states may be able to do a better job of comprehensively
regulating gestational carrier agreements. Ultimately, states
looking to enact statutes for the first time, or to amend their
current laws, should more closely follow California’s statutory
approach in order to provide clearer and more complete
guidelines for gestational carrier agreements.
All states should write or amend their gestational surrogacy
statutes to include more complete definitions of relevant terms. It
is necessary for the legislature to provide definitions for statutory
terms so that questions do not arise as to a word’s meaning. The
Supreme Court has noted the importance of providing definitions
for terms given that “statutory definitions control the meaning of
statutory words.”109 If a statute provides a definition for a term,
courts “must follow that definition, even if it varies from that
term’s ordinary meaning.”110 Furthermore, “‘[a] definition which
declares what a term “means” . . . excludes any meaning that is
not stated.’”111 If the legislature fails to provide a definition for a
term, it falls on the judiciary to interpret the meaning of those
terms. In doing so, courts may turn to dictionaries, uses of the
same term in other statutes, the legislative purpose in enacting
the statute, and other forms of legislative history.112 However, if
the legislature does provide a definition and meaning of terms,
courts must simply look to the statutory definition alone, and the
107 June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of
Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 610 (1988).
108 CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS FOR CA A.B. 1217: SURROGACY
AGREEMENTS 10 (2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_12
01-1250/ab_1217_cfa_20120702_135152_sen_comm.html.
109 Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).
110 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).
111 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
112 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2104 (2002).
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judiciary does not need to resort to guessing at the legislature’s
meaning.113
As previously mentioned, traditional and gestational
surrogacy are different procedures that lead to different legal
outcomes and varying policy implications.114 States should
explicitly make clear this important distinction to provide courts
and contracting parties with a greater understanding of what
kinds of agreements will be permitted. Definitions provided in
statutes can often be the deciding factor in a court’s
interpretation of a case, and statutory definitions have even
given rise to political debates.115
States should also include specific statutory requirements for
the legal representation of parties when creating written
gestational carrier agreements. California’s provision for each
party to be represented by independent legal counsel in creating
the agreement ensures that both parties will be on an equal
playing field. Many critics of surrogacy argue that women who
agree to carry another family’s child are driven solely by
monetary concerns and are forced by their economic situation to
sell their reproductive abilities.116 Such situations lead to
concerns of duress or coercion in contracting.117 Legal
representation will help parties be fully informed of their
obligations under the agreement and to understand the legal
implications of the surrogacy contract. Requiring parties to be
represented by legal counsel ensures that the parties will discuss
all essential terms and obligations, which will result in an
accurate contractual depiction of each party’s wants and needs
under the agreement.118 Furthermore, parties to gestational
carrier agreements are often from different states, which
necessitates that a trained legal professional research the laws of
both states in order to draft agreements that comply with the
Id.
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 19, at 213–14 (explaining that gestational surrogacy
agreements are often treated more liberally than traditional surrogacy arrangements).
115 See Rosenkranz, supra note 112, at 2110 (noting that the Defense of Marriage Act
provided a definition for the term “marriage” which only identified a union between a man
and a woman as a marriage, giving rise to significant debate and controversy).
116 See Kerian, supra note 22, at 151–52 (discussing whether women are truly
harmed by participating in surrogacy arrangements); Paula M. Barbaruolo, The Public
Policy Considerations of Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: An Analysis of Three
Jurisdictions, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39, 72–73 (1993); Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A
Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221,
1234 (1997).
117 See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139,
146 n.24 (citing United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942), which
characterizes duress as “feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on the other”).
118 Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the Contracting Process—An
Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. L. REV. 95, 103 (2011).
113
114
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laws of all states that are involved.119 For all of these reasons,
states should implement a statutory provision similar to
California’s, requiring parties to be represented by independent
legal counsel before entering into gestational carrier agreements.
With regard to contract completion and how that relates to
the overall timeline for gestational surrogacy, states should
require that parties complete the written agreements before
beginning any medical procedures. By requiring that parties
complete their contract before beginning medical procedures,
states can better ensure that parties will memorialize and agree
upon their respective obligations and responsibilities before a
child is conceived.120 This will eliminate situations where parties
engage in litigation to determine parental rights and legal
responsibilities after the child is born. By creating valid
agreements before the medical processes begin, the best interests
of the child are served, as they will have valid, legal parents from
the moment they are born.121
With regard to the financial aspects of gestational surrogacy,
states should also include statutory regulations for how money is
to be handled during the gestational carrier process. The cost to
intended parents for one child born via gestational surrogacy is
often around $100,000.122 When using a surrogacy agency to
facilitate the process, the cost can be even higher.123 Surrogacy
agencies usually require that any funds used for the surrogacy
process go through their agency, which means intended parents
are entrusting the agency with tens of thousands of dollars.124 By
regulating the financial aspects of surrogacy agreements and
providing procedures regarding how funds should be handled
through state law, state legislation can help protect intended
parents against fraud.
States should also enact initial legislation or amend their
current laws to include a provision that gestational carrier
119 Debra E. Guston & William S. Singer, A Well-Planned Family: How LGBT People
Don’t Have Children by Accident, N.J. LAW. MAG., June 2013, at 25, 28.
120 See Hakes, supra note 118, at 101, 103.
121 Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended
Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 267 (2011).
122 Susan Donaldson James, Infertile Americans Go to India for Gestational
Surrogates, ABC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/infertile-americansindia-gestational-surrogates/story?id=20808125.
123 When utilizing the services of a large surrogacy agency, the price can often be as
much as $120,000. See Mike Anderson, Surrogacy Financing: How to Afford That $60K
Price Tag, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/mymoney/2013/10/21/surrogacy-financing-how-to-afford-that-60k-price-tag.
124 See What to Expect when Working with a Surrogacy Agency, R EPROD.
POSSIBILITIES, http://www.reproductivepossibilities.com/parents_expect.cfm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2015) (noting that this particular surrogacy agency requires the intended parents
to put all funds into an escrow account).
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agreements are presumptively valid. Without this presumption,
both parties are harmed because the enforceability of the
contract is in question.125 A presumption of validity provides both
parties with an understanding that the agreement will be carried
through, and this certainty provides legitimacy to the process as
a whole.126 Furthermore, by providing that gestational carrier
agreements are presumptively valid, doctors, hospitals, and
clinics are protected from potential liability. If a gestational
carrier agreement is completed, signed, and notarized, medical
professionals know that they are legally permitted to act on the
parties’ wishes and that they will not be subject to liability for
allowing the intended parents to make medical decisions
pursuant to the agreement.127
Additionally, clearer and more complete regulation of
gestational carrier contracts will help keep costs down for
intended parents because increased predictability will lead to
less litigation and lower attorneys’ fees.128 This will help reduce
the number of couples who cannot utilize gestational surrogates
because of the prohibitively high cost of these arrangements.129
Therefore, states should draft their gestational surrogacy laws in
the interest of judicial efficiency because the overall impact these
arrangements have on courts will be lower if state statutes
provide greater predictability. Greater certainty with regard to
these contracts will also allow more infertile couples to
confidently utilize the services of gestational carriers.
IV. STRIKING THE PERFECT BALANCE: HOW MUCH SPECIFICITY IS
TOO MUCH?
While this Comment supports the statutory approach taken
by the California legislature, it should be noted that some states
have very comprehensive and even more specific gestational
surrogacy statutes that provide an even greater level of detail
than California’s. Illinois, for example, has statutes that provide
for how a married surrogate’s husband is to be included in the

Posner, supra note 16, at 23.
See
Christine
Metteer
Lorillard,
Informed
Choices
and
Uniform
Decisions: Adopting the ABA’s Self-Enforcing Administrative Model to Ensure Successful
Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & G ENDER 237, 255 (2010) (arguing that
certainty in contracting is essential because “[a]n uncertain outcome makes the
[gestational carrier] contract less valuable to both parties”).
127 Alyssa James, Note, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: Why Indiana Should
Honor Them and What Physicians Should Know Until They Do, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
175, 208 (2013).
128 Michelle Ford, Note, Gestational Surrogacy Is Not Adultery: Fighting Against
Religious Opposition to Procreate, 10 BARRY L. REV. 81, 97 (2008).
129 Id.
125
126
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contract,130 the right of the surrogate to use a physician of her
choosing,131 and requirements for a woman to even become a
surrogate in the first place.132 However, this statutory scheme is
not without its deficiencies. Illinois’s statute has effectively
removed the judiciary from the surrogacy process entirely,
making it possible for intended parents to establish their
parentage without a court order.133 This opens the door for legal
issues when intended parents who travel to Illinois to utilize a
surrogate return home to their own state, which may or may not
have a favorable view of surrogacy. Authorities may question the
intended parent’s legal custody of their child and, if asked to
produce documentation of their parentage, they will not have a
court order identifying themselves as the child’s legal guardians.
As this area of the law develops, it will be important for
legislatures and advocates alike to consider the practical
implications of statutory schemes, whether they provide minimal
or specific amounts of detail.
CONCLUSION
By adopting a statutory model similar to California’s, states
can better regulate and monitor gestational surrogacy
arrangements. Although Connecticut has created a workable
statutory framework to enforce gestational surrogacy
agreements, more can be done to provide a greater level of
certainty and predictability for those who are parties to these
contracts. Surrogacy agreements are here to stay, and states
should not take a minimalist approach to the regulation of these
complex contracts. In working towards creating statutory
provisions with predictable practical implications, legislatures
130 See 750 ILL . COMP. S TAT. 47/25(c)(2) (2014) (“A gestational surrogacy contract shall
provide for[,] . . . if the gestational surrogate is married, the express agreement of her
husband to: (i) undertake the obligations imposed on the gestational surrogate pursuant
to the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract; [and] (ii) surrender custody of the child
to the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child.”).
131 See 750 I LL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(c)(3) (“A gestational surrogacy contract shall
provide for . . . the right of the gestational surrogate to utilize the services of a physician
of her choosing, after consultation with the intended parents, to provide her care during
the pregnancy.”).
132 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20. To be eligible to be a gestational carrier under this
statute, a woman must be at least twenty-one years old, have given birth to at least one
child, completed a medical and mental health evaluation, undergone legal consultation
regarding the terms and potential consequences of the contract, and obtained a health
insurance policy that will cover major medical expenses throughout the intended
pregnancy and for eight weeks after the birth of the child. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(a).
133 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/35. Under this statutory scheme, “a parent-child
relationship shall be established prior to the birth of a child born through gestational
surrogacy if . . . the attorneys representing both the gestational surrogate and the
intended parent or parents certify that the parties entered into a gestational surrogacy
contract intended to satisfy the requirements” of the Act. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT . 47/35(a).
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will be one step closer towards creating a more uniform
state-statutory approach in regulating surrogacy. By including
more specific and comprehensive regulations of the contents of
gestational carrier contracts and the surrogacy process itself,
states can better provide intended parents with certainty and
assurance that they will be recognized as the legal parents of
their children born through a gestational surrogate.

